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With the help of rapidly developing technology, DNA se-
quencing is becoming less expensive. As a consequence, the
research in genomics has gained speed in paving the way to
personalized (genomic) medicine, and geneticists need large
collections of human genomes to further increase this speed.
Furthermore, individuals are using their genomes to learn
about their (genetic) predispositions to diseases, their an-
cestries, and even their (genetic) compatibilities with po-
tential partners. This trend has also caused the launch of
health-related websites and online social networks (OSNs),
in which individuals share their genomic data (e.g., Open-
SNP or 23andMe). On the other hand, genomic data carries
much sensitive information about its owner. By analyzing
the DNA of an individual, it is now possible to learn about
his disease predispositions (e.g., for Alzheimer’s or Parkin-
son’s), ancestries, and physical attributes. The threat to
genomic privacy is magnified by the fact that a person’s
genome is correlated to his family members’ genomes, thus
leading to interdependent privacy risks. This short tutorial
will help computer scientists better understand the privacy
and security challenges in today’s genomic era. We will first
highlight the significance of genomic data and the threats
for genomic privacy. Then, we will present the high level
descriptions of the proposed solutions to protect the privacy
of genomic data and we will discuss future research direc-
tions. No prerequisite knowledge on biology or genomics is
required for the attendees of this proposal. We only require
the attendees to have a slight background on cryptography
and statistics.
1. OVERVIEW OF THE TUTORIAL
We briefly provide an overview of the proposed tutorial in
the following.
1.1 What is Genomic Data?
To familiarize computer scientists with the topic, we will
first briefly provide a gentle background on genomic data.
Without going into details, we will describe the pipeline for
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the generation of digital genomic data starting from the bi-
ological samples and going all the way to the utilization of
genomic data for different purposes.
1.2 Why is Genomic Data Special?
Genomic data has many unique features. To motivate the
discussion, we will highlight some of these features. One
notable feature is how it is static and of long-lived value.
Most medical data, such as body temperature and blood
pressure, are of relatively short term value, whereas genomic
data changes little over a lifetime and may have value that
lasts for decades.
While DNA has been used for some time in parentage
tests, it can be generalized from such studies to enable broader
inference of kinship relations. Services such as Ancestry.com
and 23andme.com already offer kinship services based on
DNA testing. While a substantial portion of an individual’s
DNA is in common with that of her relatives, it is also unique
to her (unless she has an identical twin). This has another
set of implications about potential use of genomic data, like
its ability to link to her personally, a property that makes
DNA testing useful in criminal forensics.
Another essential value of DNA relates to its ability for di-
agnosing problems in health and behavior. Tests are able to
demonstrate increased likelihood for conditions like macular
degeneration in old age and Alzheimer’s (the most common
form of dementia). Although these are often probabilities,
they can have diagnostic value as well as privacy ramifica-
tions. This power for good and bad has led genomic data
to have a certain “mystique”, which has been promoted by
scientists and the media.
1.3 Privacy and Security Related Implications
of Genomic Data
Genomic data already has many uses in several areas in
real-life. In general, such areas can be summarized as (i)
healthcare, (ii) research, (iii) direct-to-consumer (DTC) ge-
nomics, and (iv) forensics. Such wide usage of genomic
data also raises serious privacy-related concerns on the data.
Thus, we will discuss some well-known and important at-
tacks on privacy of genomic data.
It has been shown that anonymization is an ineffective
technique for sharing genomic data [9, 10]. For instance,
genomic variants on the Y chromosome are correlated with
the last name (for males) and this last name can be inferred
using public genealogy databases. Also, unique features in
patient-location visit patterns in a distributed health care
environment can be used to link the genomic data to the
identity of the individuals in publicly available records [18].
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The identity of a participant of a genomic study can also
be revealed by using a second sample, that is, part of the
DNA information from the individual and the results of the
corresponding clinical study [11, 23, 9]. Homer et al. prove
that the presence of an individual in a case group can be de-
termined by using aggregate allele frequencies and his DNA
profile [11]. This work compelled the NIH, as well as the
Wellcome Trust in the UK, to remove all publicly available
aggregate genomic data from their websites. Wang et al.
showed a higher risk that individuals can actually be iden-
tified from a relatively small set of statistics, such as those
routinely published in GWAS papers [23]. Humbert et al.
evaluated the genomic privacy of an individual threatened
by his relatives revealing their genomes [13]. Very recently,
Shringarpure and Bustamante showed that it is possible to
identify members of a beacon server1 by using the results of
the queries [20].
1.4 Proposed Solutions for Privacy and Secu-
rity of Genomic Data
Next, focusing on the below issues, we will highlight some
of the existing solutions for the security and privacy of ge-
nomic data.
Read mapping and alignment: Jha et al. proposed a privacy-
preserving implementation of fundamental genomic compu-
tations for sequence alignment [17]. Chen et al. proposed a
privacy-preserving method to align short sequences by out-
sourcing the computation to the cloud [6].
Processing or raw genomic data: Ayday et al. proposed a
technique for privacy preserving storage, retrieval, and pro-
cessing of raw genomic data [1].
Storage: Traditional cryptographic techniques are prone to
brute-force attacks. It is not too far-fetched to imagine that
a third-party in possession of an encrypted genome might
be able to decrypt it years or decades later. To counter this
problem, Huang et al. proposed a scheme named GenoGuard
to protect genomic data against brute force attacks [12].
Clinical use of genomic data: De Cristofaro et al. proposed
a secure protocol between two parties for testing genomic
sequences without the leaking of any private information
about the genomic sequence or the nature of the test [7].
Ayday et al. proposed a scheme to protect the privacy of
users’ genomic data while enabling medical units to access
the genomic data in order to conduct medical tests or to
develop personalized medicine methods [2, 3].
Genomic research: Efforts to provide privacy-preserving use
of genomic data in research can be put in three main cate-
gories: (i) techniques based on differential privacy, in which
a controlled noise is added to the result of a query (to a
genomic database) [15, 8, 21], (ii) techniques based on cryp-
tography, in which the use of homomorphic encryption, se-
cure hardware, or secure multiparty computation are pro-
posed for privacy-preserving genomic research [16, 5], and
(iii) techniques based on optimization, in which the goal is to
maximize the amount of publicly shared genomic data while
also complying the privacy preferences of individuals [14].
Comparing genomes: Troncoso-Pastoriza et al. proposed
1Beacon hosts genomic data of people with a certain disease.
Researchers can query the beacon by asking for the existence
of an entry, that is a certain allele at a specific position. The
beacons response can be either “yes” or “no”.
an algorithm for private string searching on the DNA se-
quence by using a finite state machine [22]. Baldi et al.
made use of private-set intersection and present an effec-
tive algorithm for privacy-preserving substring matching on
DNA sequences [4]. Naveed et al. proposed using functional
encryption for privacy-preserving similarity test on genomic
data [19]. Recently, Wang et al. proposed private edit dis-
tance protocols to find similar patients (e.g., across several
hospitals) [23].
1.5 Open Research Directions
Finally, we will discuss the open research problems about
the security and privacy of genomic data. In particular, we
will discuss (i) genomic data sharing between different enti-
ties, (ii) privacy vs. utility of genomic data, (iii) integrat-
ing genomic data in individuals’ electronic health records,
(iv) access control issues, (v) credibility and liability issues
of genomic data, and (vi) standardization efforts by Global
Alliance for Genomics and Health (GA4GH).
Personalized medicine brings the promise of better diag-
noses, better treatments, a higher quality of life, and in-
creased longevity. To achieve these noble goals, it exploits a
number of revolutionary technologies, including genome se-
quencing and DNA editing, as well as wearable devices and
implantable or even edible biosensors. In parallel, the popu-
larity of“quantified self”gadgets shows the willingness of cit-
izens to be more proactive with respect to their own health.
Yet, this evolution opens the door to all kinds of abuses, no-
tably in terms of discrimination, blackmailing, stalking, and
subversion of devices. We are convinced that this tutorial
will significantly contribute to the awareness of our commu-
nity with respect to the magnitude of the challenge and will
help it design timely and effective solutions.
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